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FAULKNER'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW
Morris Wolff*
William Faulkner was an excellent "curbstone lawyer." He was
a man who learned and applied the law without any formal legal
education. The best evidence of Faulkner's knowledge of the law
is his accuracy in its use. This accuracy can be demonstrated by
comparing his legal references in the stories and anecdotes of the
Snopes Trilogy to actual courtroom cases recorded in the Missis-
sippi Reports and statutes at the time the three novels of the Tril-
ogy (The Hamlet, The Town, and The Mansion) were written. That
Faulkner had a meticulous interest in legal detail and a good work-
ing knowledge of the law is reflected in the accurate legal refer-
ences woven into the structure of his stories.' Not only are his
legal quotations correct; some of them can be traced to actual cases
recorded in the Mississippi Reports, a fact which suggests that
Faulkner may have read the law as part of his self-education.
Some sources for his knowledge of the law may be suggested.
Faulkner received no formal legal education, but as a child, and
later as a writer, he was surrounded by friends and relatives who
were trained in the law. Faulkner came from a family of law-
yers. His great-grandfather W. C. Falkner; his grandfather John
Wesley Thompson Falkner; his uncle John Wesley Thompson
Falkner, II; and his first cousin John Wesley Thompson Falkner,
IV, were all practicing lawyers. According to his nephew Jimmy
Falkner, "William came to know the law through listening to law
stories told during family discussions. He had a photographic mind
and an excellent memory. Whatever he heard he remembered." 2
In addition to practicing law, his grandfather, as a banker, dealt
with money and banking law on a daily basis-perhaps impart-
ing to Faulkner the knowledge of money and banking which he
used in endowing Flem Snopes with the legal knowledge needed
for his rise to leadership in the local banking community.
Faulkner was meticulous in his use of the law. At times he would
verify the accuracy of his knowledge by checking with lawyers.
On one occasion Faulkner wanted to know the legal procedure
involved in a congressional election. He proceeded to the law of-
fice of his literary agent, Philip Stone, where he spoke with one
* Professor of Law. Delaware Law School, Widener University.
1. Faulkner's concern for accuracy in specialized fields suggests that before using either Indian Lore or
the Law he carefully researched the field of interest. For an article which reflects Faulkners deep concern
for accuracy in specialized fields of research, the reader is referred to A. A. Hill, "Three Examples of Unex-
pectedly Accurate Indian Lore.' Texas Studies in Literature and Language 6 (1964): 80.
2. Jimmy Falkner, interview in William Faulkner's personal library at Rowan Oak, Oxford, Mississippi,
July 31. 1977.
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of Stone's law partners, T. H. Freeland, III. Freeland recalled
the incident:
I told him exactly what was involved and he listened carefully. When I was done he looked
up at the volumes behind me and asked me to take a look at the specific statute in the
United States Code just to be sure that my oral recollection was correct. On several occa-
sions he discussed the law with Mr. Phil (Philip Stone),'
Upon entering the law offices where Philip Stone once maintained
his practice, one notices that the entire wall on the right side,
stretching to a height of twelve feet and a width of twenty-five
feet, is occupied by glass bookcases filled with law books. These
law books have been there, according to present members of the
firm, since 1920, and many volumes bear the name "James Stone
and Son" on their cover. These books were readily available to
Faulkner, who regularly visited Stone's law offices. Stone routinely
kept Faulkner waiting in the lobby near the bookcases for ten to
fifteen minutes each time he came, even when Stone had nothing
else to do.' Faulkner was a voracious reader, and it is possible,
that while waiting to see Stone he might have pulled volumes from
the bookcases and actually read some of the cases. In addition,
according to both Freeland and Jimmy Falkner, Stone discussed
with Faulkner humorous cases which Stone had found in the
Mississippi Reports. The cases mentioned later in this paper, par-
ticularly Minor v. Dockery' and Bloodworth v. Stevens,' would
have been available to Faulkner at the time he wrote and com-
pleted The Hamlet in 1939. According to one critic, H. Edward
Richardson, it may have been books in Stone's library which
originally stimulated Faulkner's interest in the law as a resource
for tales or stories.7 In his article Richardson relates that "Faulkner
read Stone's library and stored a virtual reservoir of the man's
ideas, which continued to flow with rich depths of humor over
the years." 8 Stone, in addition to making his library available,
may have helped Faulkner verify the accuracy of his legal
references. Since Faulkner used Stone's library, we assume that
he had access to Stone's law books as well as to his legal
knowledge. According to Richardson, Stone helped Faulkner to
develop some of the stories concerning the Snopes clan:
3. T. H. Freeland, 11I, interview in his law office, Oxford, Mississippi, August 1, 1977.
4. Id.
5. 125 Miss. 727, 88 So. 321 (1921).
6. 51 Miss. 475 (1875).
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So in their conversations during long walks about the countryside, the Snopes clan emerged
with growing power, and Stone even gave names to some of them, such as Admiral Dewey
and Wall Street Panic Snopes. The many conversations of the two men were often based
upon stories that grew to such involved proportions that Faulkner often found it necessary
to return to Stone's office in order to check his lore.'
And the lore which Faulkner carefully checked for accuracy may
have been the legal anecdotes which Stone shared with his friend.
Joseph Blotner also suggests that Stone was one of Faulkner's
sources for legal knowledge and accuracy. According to Blotner:
[Stone] was entranced with the turns and twists of human behavior which his legal prac-
tice daily showed him . . . . There in Stone's law office the two men would talk about
the actual doings of people like the Snopeses. And when the fancy struck them, they would
make up wild, outrageous stories of things which no Snopes-counterpart may have done.
but things of which they thought them perfectly capable."
These "wild, outrageous stories" may have included the two legal
anecdotes-the "Pound Fee" incident included in The Mansion and
the "Spotted Horses" episode included in The Hamlet-which are
considered later in this paper.
In addition to possibly using Stone's mind to test the legal ac-
curacy of his anecdotes, and possibly using Stone's law library
as a resource to verify the accuracy of certain "stories," Faulkner
may have augmented his knowledge of the law by listening to
courtroom trials in Oxford and by speaking with lawyers, who
were waiting for cases to be heard.1 Oxford is the county seat,
and the location for courtroom trials. Law offices are located
around the square. On the benches outside the courthouse,
Faulkner, the great listener, probably heard stories about actual
cases.12 The drugstore where Faulkner often stood was directly
across from the courthouse, and perhaps the two anecdotes to be
examined here first came to his ears either in the courtroom or
through the conversation of two lawyers as they emerged from
the courthouse.
In the "Spotted Horses" episode the fictional anecdote can be
traced back to possible roots in a Mississippi case, Minor v.
9. Id. at 138. in his article, Richardson portrays Stone as a source for Faulkner's knowledge of the law.
According to Richardson, Stone was a i[Qriend, teacher, editor, advisor, a cultured man with a creative mind
in his own right ... Phil Stone stands in a relationship to Faulkner similar to that of Mentor Graham to Lin-
coln, or William Godwin to Shelley, although the Stone-Faulkner association was much closer in both age
and mutuality of literary interest. Faulkner read Stone's library and stored a virtual reservior of the man's ideas,
which continued to flow with rich depths of humor over the years." Id. at 139.
10. Joseph Blotner, Faulkner: A Biography (New York: Random House, 1974). Vol. I, p. 537.
II. This possibility was suggested by Faulkner's friend and attorney and former Dean of the University
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Dockery. " This case was decided by the Mississippi Supreme
Court in March of 1921, ten years prior to its possible inclusion
in "Spotted Horses," a short story which was published in 1931
in Scribner's Magazine and later (in 1940) incorporated into The
Hamlet.
In the "Pound Fee" incident, an assortment of law cases and
statutes, which Faulkner may have read or learned of through yarn-
swapping sessions with friends in Oxford, are considered.
THE LAW AND "SPOTTED HORSES"
In the "Spotted Horses" episode a herd of wild horses had been
brought to town for an auction. They were placed in a barn's cor-
ral under the direction of Eck Snopes, a member of the Snopes
clan, and a stranger identified only as the "Texas Man." The cor-
ralled horses escaped and injured two men in the community whose
wives brought actions to recover damages for their husbands' in-
juries.
Vernon Tull was injured when the cart in which he and his
family rode was upset by one of the runaway "spotted horses."'
The horse causing Tull's injuries had been given to Eck Snopes
by the "Texas Man" to overcome the auction crowd's disinterest
in bidding for wild horses. Mrs. Tull sought damages for her hus-
band's injuries in the action Tull pl. vs. Eckrum Snopes.
After bidding began, Henry Armstid bid for and purchased one
of the "spotted horses" for five dollars, in spite of his wife's pro-
tests that the couple's few remaining dollars should be spent on
winter shoes for their children. Mrs. Armstid was assured by the
"Texas Man" that the five dollars her husband had paid for the
horse would be returned by Flem Snopes. After her husband was
injured by a runaway horse and Flem failed to return the pur-
chase price, Mrs. Armstid brought the action Armstid pl. vs.
Snopes.
There was no bill of sale to indicate who owned the horses that
had injured Tull and Armstid. Eck, however, claimed to own the
horse which had escaped from the corral and, while running down
the road, had bumped into the wagon of Vernon and Mrs. Tull.
Although Flem Snopes had not received money for the horse at
the time of the escape, the transfer of money alone would not have
been sufficient to prove Flem's ownership and liability for the in-
juries. The "Texas Man," who had brought the horses to town
for the auction and who could presumably identify the man to
13. 125 Miss. 727. 88 So. 321 (1921).
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whom he had sold the particular horses, left town prior to the
horses' escape. Both Eck and Flem Snopes, through their control
of the horses, would appear to be accountable for injuries that
the horses had caused; yet neither one, according to the justice
of the peace, could be held liable as an owner. Eck even admits
ownership: "It [the horse] was mine. How much do I have to
,, 14
The justice of the peace's narrow reading of the law exonerates
both Eck and Flem. His refusal to permit Eck to admit owner-
ship and his insistence that a recorded document of title, bill of
sale, or actual possession of the horse be shown to prove Eck's
ownership leads to a harsh and unfair result. Eck might have suc-
cessfully asserted ownership of the animal if he had taken pos-
session of the animal on finding it alive in a field after the escape.
The reader's sense of justice is disturbed by the unfair and highly
technical ("legalistic") result. The judge prevents justice by pro-
hibiting Eck's payment of damages to the injured and innocent
bystander who protests: "[M]y wagon is wrecked; my husband
is jerked out of it and knocked unconscious and unable to work
for a whole week with less than half of our seed in the ground,
and I get nothing." 15 To add final insult to injury the justice of
the peace advises the family that they can only look to the dead
horse, as perpetrator of the injuries and not to Eck, as a source
of compensation for their damages. As often happens in Faulkner's
"legal situations," our expectations of justice and firtancial award
are jarred by the intervention of the law which produces an un-
fair result. The justice of the peace rules that:
"[Tihe injured or damaged party shall find recompense in the body of the animal. And
since Eck Snopes never owned that horse at all, and since you just heard a case here this
morning that failed to prove that Flem Snopes had any equity in any of them, that horse
still belongs to that Texas Man. Or did belong. Because now that horse that made your
team run away and snatch your husband out of the wagon, belongs to you and Mr. Tull."
"The horse!" Mrs. Tull shouted. "We see it for five seconds, while it is climbing into
the wagon with us and then out again. Then it's gone, God dont know where and thank
the Lord He dont! And the mules gone with it and the wagon wrecked and you laying
there on the bridge with your face full of kindlingwood and bleeding like a hog and dead
for all we knew. And he gives us the horse!"
"I cant stand no more!" The old Justice cried. "I wont! This court's adjourned! Ad-
journed!""
14. William Faulkner, The Hamlet (New York: Random House, 1940), p. 335.
15. Id., p. 337.
16. Id., p. 337-38.
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The outrageous courtroom result can only be understood in the
context of Faulkner's plot. In trying to discover why the law as
applied, seems to go haywire, the reader is reminded that Snope-
sian interests never lose in a brush with the law; Flem Snopes's
behavior is above legal correction. His position, outside the le-
gal system, is part of his power. Faulkner will not permit a rela-
tive (Eck Snopes) to be ensnared in the law as long as his relative
is representing Flem's business interests. When he loses that pro-
tection, legal punishment can ensue. Mrs. Tull's interests clash
with the interests of a powerful Flem Snopes before an uncoura-
geous and cowardly justice of the peace. The law is invoked by
the judge to support Flem's political power. The law is not cor-
rupt, but its application in the hands of ignorant people has a cor-
rupting effect.
The judge has only a superficial knowledge of the law and a
superficial commitment to justice. Only one page of his law book,
the 1881 Mississippi Reports, has been used, having a "thread-
thin line of soilure as if during all the time of his posssession its
owner . . .had opened it at only one page though that quite
often . . . ." " The justice of the peace is a political hack, not an
objective dispenser of justice. He can only regurgitate borrowed
information. He is intimidated and takes the side of the rich and
the powerful against the interests of the displaced and the poor.
He twists the law to fit Flem's power interests, and rejects Eck's
natural impulse to offer to pay. A finding of liability and thus
a requirement that damages be paid might suggest that Snopesian
interests are within the jurisdiction of the courts and within the
constraints of the legal system. Flem is too shrewd to be brought
into court by subpoena and too clever to be punished for any in-
jury that his livestock may have caused the plaintiff. This insula-
tion from legal process and court appearance coincides with Flem's
rise to power. He is depicted as a manipulator of legal processes
rather than as subject to them.
Faulkner uses the law as a foil. What occurs in the courtroom
disturbs our reasonable expectation with regard to courtroom pro-
cedure. The lawsuit provides a result, which is unexpected, ar-
tificial and bizarre. The litigants have not been given justice; they
have not been made whole. The application of the law to the facts
has not brought a rational result. On one level the result is
humorous in a black, comic way. But for those who are vicitimized
17. Id., p. 328.
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by the irrational application of the law, the reaction is outrage,
and a sense of defeat.
The justice of the peace's decision, exonerating Flem and Eck
from liability for injuries caused by the livestock, is based on a
tortured interpretation of an old legal doctrine, damnum absque
injuria or injuries without an action for damages. The judge found
that the injuries inflicted by the escaping horses were merely the
result of risks that one undertakes as a member of organized socie-
ty. "[C]ompensation for such risks may be found in the general
welfare which the society is organized to promote." 8 The justice
of the peace accurately states the rule of law regarding the liability
of livestock owners for injuries caused by their animals.
"If you please, ma'am," the Justice said ....
"The injury to your husband aint disputed ....
The law says that when a man owns a creature which he knows to be dangerous and
if that creature ... known to him to be dangerous ceases to be restrained by that suitable
pen or enclosure, either by accident or design and either with or without the owner's
knowledge, then that owner is liable. That's the law. All necessary now is to establish
first, the ownership of the horse, and second, that the horse was a dangerous creature
within the definition of the law as provided." ,
By comparing the judge's statement of the law to the language
in Minor v. Dockery,2" we can see the possible source of Faulkner's
legal knowledge. In Minor v. Dockery, the Mississippi Supreme
Court states that: "[T]he owners of trespassing stock are made
absolutely liable for all damages done by such stock."' 2 This strict
liability for owners of trespassing stock was based on "[tihe statute
(section 2222, Code of 1906; section 4541, Hemmingway's Code),
[which] provides that, 'Every owner of ... shall be liable,' etc." 2
Faulkner may have modified the language of Minor for dramatic
impact and may have removed the section and code numbers. The
language is otherwise quite similar. The facts of Minor v. Dockery
are surprisingly similar to the facts in the "Spotted Horses" episode.
Although Mr. Tull was trampled by a runaway horse in "Spotted
Horses," Miss Dockery's crops were trampled by unrestrained
cattle, horses, and mules in Minor. In each case, the legal owner-
ship of the animals causing injury is an issue at trial. One of the
attorneys in Minor (Ratcliff) bears almost the same name as that
of a major character in the "Spotted Horses" episode, a fact that
18. Pleasants v. Smith, 90 Miss. 440, 450, 43 So. 475, 476 (1907).
19. Faulkner. The Hamlet, p. 334-35.
20. 125 Miss. 727, 88 So. 321 (1921).
21. Id. at 732, 88 So. at 321.
22. Id.
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episode, a fact that may be more than mere coincidence. Know-
ing that Faulkner loved detective stories, this could be his clever
way of creating a link between the court case and his story. Or
perhaps the name caught his fancy while reading the case and later
emerged from his subconscious as part of the episode, especially
since Ratliff throughout The Hamlet shows some of the negotia-
tor qualities of a shrewd lawyer.
There is additional evidence that Faulkner may have read Minor
v. Dockery and later used it for plot material. Under the law of
Mississippi as stated in Minor, one who has possession of a horse
as an agent for a principal who owns the horse which injures or
otherwise harms another, "is liable to no one except his principal
for damages resulting from an omission or neglect of duty . ..." 23
Unlike an agent, one who has possession of another's animal as
a bailee "is the owner pro hac vice of the subject of bailment [the
animal]. An owner pro hac vice has some interest or title in the
property. As a bailee, he would be such an owner."" Assigned
the status of owners, bailees of livestock are "made absolutely
liable for all damages done by such [trespassing] stock." 5 As in
Minor, the outcome of "Spotted Horses" turns on whether the
defendants, Eck and Flem, are legally characterized as owners,
agents, or bailees. Eck is deemed by the court to be an agent act-
ing on behalf of the "Texas Man;" the defendant in Minor v.
Dockery is also found to be an agent. No legal liability is the result
in both cases. If Faulkner had allowed the judge to consider the
fact that Eck held money for the "Texas Man," corralled the horses,
and watched over the horses during the auction, he might have
characterized Eck's legal status as that of a bailee and not an agent.
Thus, Eck would have been liable for the injuries to Mr. Tull.
In both "Spotted Horses" and in Minor there is a finding of no
liability for the custodian of the livestock. In both, a finding of
agency and a rejection of liability based on bailment is the legal
result. In both cases, the injured party is left without compensa-
tion, despite the availability of a potential remedy under the theory
of bailment.
Faulkner in "Spotted Horses" accurately applies the legal doc-
trines expressed in Minor v. Dockery. The judge in Minor states
the opposing theories of bailment (under which possession of the
livestock without title is sufficient to establish liability) and agency
23. Id.
24. Id. at 733. 88 So. at 322.
25. Id. at 732. 88 So. at 321.
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(under which possession without title is not sufficient to establish
liability). The court states that:
lUInder the terms of the statute imposing absolute liability only the owners Ithe "Texas
Man"] are made liable . . . an agent [Flem] is liable to no one exccpt his principal [the
"Texas Man"] for damages resulting from an omission or neglect of duty in respect to
the business of the agency.
But a mere agent in charge of personal property for his principal, is not the owner in
any such sense."
Most of Frenchman's Bend believed that Flem owned the horses
when he arrived in town with them. But Faulkner leaves the issue
of Flem's ownership purposely ambiguous.
"Boys," Ratliffsaid, "Eck knows all about them horses. Flem's told him how much they
cost and how much him and that Texas man aim to get for them. make off of them. Come
on Eck. Tell us."
"I dont know," he said.
"Eck dont know who them horses belong to anymore than we do," one of the others
said. "He knows that Flem come here on the same wagon with them, because he saw him.
But that's all." "
Even Ratliff suggests that the only way to find out who is the
owner of the horses was to "wait until the auction's over and split
up and some can follow Flem and some can follow that Texas
fellow and watch to see which one spends the money." 28 Faulkner
maintains a sense of ambiguity and follows the legal thinking ex-
pressed in Minor to assist the development of his story. Had
Faulkner permitted the justice of the peace to find sufficient evi-
dence of bailment, Eck as a bailee would have been liable for
the injuries. Indeed, Eck thought he was the owner: "Was that
your horse that ran over Mr. Tull?" "Yes," Eck said. "It was mine.
How much do I have to p - I'm sorry it made Tull's mules snatch
him outen the wagon. How much do I owe him?" 
2 9
The court should have accepted this admission of ownership
and found Eck liable, but this result might have hindered Flem's
swift rise to power, and left Faulkner with a villain-hero who no
longer appeared to be "above the law." Faulkner refuses to limit
Flem's rise to power by a finding of liability. Instead, Faulkner
26. Id. at 732, 733-34, 88 So. at 321, 322.
27. Faulkner. The Hamlet, pp. 282-84.
28. Id.. p. 280.
29. Id., p. 335-36.
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insulates Flem from the law's effect. Flem has a certain arrogance
towards the law (as symbolized by his spitting in the following
quotation) which is based on his control of the system, coupled
with his astute knowledge of how to make the law work to his
own advantage:
Flem Snopes flatly refused to recognize the existence of the suit against himself, stating
once and without heat and first turning his head slightly aside to spit, "They wasn't none
of my horses," then fell to whittling again while the baffled and helpless bailiff stood be-
fore the tilted chair with the papers he was trying to serve."
The justice of the peace could have required Flem to be pres-
ent at his own trial since a subpoena had been served on Flem.
The justice of the peace could have found Flem in contempt of
court and punished him for his failure to appear:
"Wait," the Justice said. He looked about at the faces, the blurred eyes fleeing behind
the thick lenses. "Where is the defendant? I dont see him."
"He wouldn't come," the bailiff said.
"Wouldn't come?" the Justice said. "Didn't you serve the papers on him?"
"He wouldn't take them," the bailiff said. "He said -"
"Then he is in contempt!" the Justice cried.
"So he refuses to defend himself," the Justice said. "Dont he know that I can find against
him for that reason, even if pure justice and decency aint enough?"
"It'll be pure something," Snopes said. "It dont take no mind-reader to see how your
mind is __ ."
"Shut up, [Lump] Snopes," the bailiff said. "If you aint in this case, you keep out of
it." He turned back to the Justice. "What you want me to do: go over to the Bend and
fetch [Flem] Snopes here anyway? I reckon I can do it."
"No," the Justice said. "Wait." He looked about at the sober faces again with that baffle-
ment, that dread. "Does anybody here know for sho who them horses belonged to? Any-
body?" They looked back at him, sober, attentive-at the neat immaculate old man sitting
with his hands locked together on the table before him to still the trembling."
Despite his assertion that Flem is in contempt, the justice of
the peace, as evidenced by his trembling hands and later by his
quick adjournment of the court, is portrayed as too cowardly to
try to bring Flem within the law's power.
It is clear from a review of Minor v. Dockery" that the justice
of the peace in the "Spotted Horses" episode had a sufficient legal
basis to find Flem or Eck liable for the injuries. This conclusion
is based on the author's comparison of the facts in Minor with
the facts that culminated in actions against Flem and Eck Snopes
and a determination that the theory of bailee liability in Minor
30. Id., p. 327.
31. Id., p. 330.
32. 125 Miss. 727. 88 So. 321 (1921).
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could have been employed by the justice of the peace to reach
a more just result.
Thus, it becomes apparent that Faulkner had the opportunity
to guide matters towards either legal outcome depending on what
he wished to do with Flem at this point in the story. Either
choice-liability as a bailee or no liability as an agent-could be
inferred from the facts.
Faulkner's choice of legal outcomes helps to sustain Flem's im-
age of invulnerability. This image had been developed in earlier
fact situations where Flem proved to be "uncatchable." In the "Sto-
len Brass" incident Flem directs two young boys to steal brass
fittings from the power plant and hide them in the town water
tank so that he can escape arrest. Despite a full court hearing,
no trail to Flem's masterminding of the crime can be established
and he is not brought to justice. Flem is also effective in using
the law to rid the town of two of his embarassing relatives. After
Mink Snopes commits murder, Flem insures that he will receive
a long sentence by refusing to hire experienced legal counsel and
permitting the case to be tried by "a young man graduated only
last June from the State University's law school . . . who did what
he could and overdid what he could not, zealous and, for all prac-
tical purposes and results, ignored . . . ."" In a separate incident
he successfully traps Montgomery Ward Snopes, who has been
running a pornographic peep show, by planting moonshine liquor
among the man's photographic supplies in order to have him ar-
rested for possession of untaxed liquor. Both Flem and Gavin
Stevens, county prosecutor, participate in planting the incriminat-
ing evidence on the premises. In both situations the law punishes
the wrong person, and abets injustice.
In the "Spotted Horses" episode, the law creates injustice part-
ly because the facts concerning control and ownership remain
cloudy and ambiguous. Legal outcomes at this point are used to
benefit rather than injure Flem in his steady rise to power. With
regard to just compensation for injuries to an innocent victim,
the narrow and conservative decision of the justice of the peace
seems unduly harsh:
"Yes, ma'am," the Justice said. "Your damages are fixed by statute. The law says that
when a suit for damages is brought against the owner of an animal which has committed
damage or injury, if the owner of the animal either cant or wont assume liability, the in-
jured or damaged party shall find recompense in the body of the animal."
33. Faulkner, The Hamlet. p. 338.
34. Id., p. 337.
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Faulkner also suggests that given the power of Flem Snopes,
the justice of the peace must twist the law, choose the more ex-
pedient option, and find no liability. The justice of the peace re-
lies on the purported absence of ownership and actual possession
to avoid a finding of liability even when Eck has enough decency
to assume responsibility for the behavior of the horse. The justice
of the peace creates an injustice to avoid a judgement against the
Snopeses. One's expectations are jarred as the judge significantly
ignores the demands of justice and rearranges the facts presented
so that the issue of ownership appears ambiguous and the injured
have no cause of action against Flem or Eck Snopes. Since a fair
outcome is available, the judge must restructure the facts. What
should happen does not happen in a world where Snopesian in-
terests must prevail. Instead of money damages, Vernon Tull is
given the body of a dead horse. The law as administered by the
justice of the peace interferes with rather than leads to justice.
Faulkner adopts a technical and narrow interpretation of the law
rather than a liberal, policy-oriented interpretation, so that a denial
of justice can result. No creative or equitable result is tolerated.
The law is used to support the power interests of the Snopes fam-
ily. What does this tell us about Faulkner's own cosmic attitude
towards the law as a force in society? The justice of the peace's
character is defined through his lack of original thought or crea-
tive expression. The judge's willingness to misapply the law
renders him a powerless eunuch. He acts without compassion for
the injured and without the imagination necessary to fashion a
just remedy, even when the ingredients are available. He is a
cipher, controlled by the ruling interests of the Snopes clan. He
is overwhelmed by his legal responsibility as his trembling hands
and quick adjournment of court suggest. Faulkner knows the law
and consciously leaves the issue of ownership unresolved. We
are not permitted to learn whether ownership by Flem was ever
obtained. Faulkner gives us a Flem so astute that he makes it im-
possible to prove that he is a bailee. Indeed, the omission of a
reference to the theory of bailment may indicate Faulkner's
knowledge of the law, his familiarity with Minor v. Dockery,"5
and his conscious omission of this alternative in order to protect
the interests of the Snopes family in this early section of the trilogy.
THE LAW AND THE "POUND FEE"
In the "Pound Fee" incident of The Mansion, Faulkner explores
35. 125 Miss. 727. 88 So. 321 (1921).
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the legal obligation of an owner of livestock to pay a pound fee
for the shelter and feed accorded a stray cow after it had wandered
on to a neighbor's property. Under Mississippi law, a landowner
who takes in a lost or stray cow, mule, horse or other animal is
entitled to a daily fee for providing feed and care for the animal
during the period of its impoundment on his property." Mink
Snopes learns that his cow has escaped and is grazing on Houston's
property; he also knows that:
By not claiming the worthless cow yet, he would not only winter her, he would winter
her twice-ten times-as well as he himself could afford to. He would not only let Houston
winter her ... but when he would reclaim the cow in the spring she would have come
in season again and, running with Houston's beef herd-bull, would now be carrying a calf
which would not only freshen her for milk but would itself be worth money as grade
beef ...."
Mink knows that the law will require him to pay a pound fee
for each day it receives care as long as his ownership of the cow
can be determined. In an effort to avoid liability for payment of
the fee, Mink first invents a story that he has sold the cow to Nub
Gowrie and later concocts a story of repurchase from Gowrie.
At winter's end, Mink ventures to Houston's home and livestock
feedlot to reclaim his cow.
"I thought you sold that cow to Nub Gowrie," Houston said.
"So did I," Mink said. "Until Nub rid up this morning on a mule and said that cow broke
out of his lot the same night he got her home and he aint seen her since, and collected
back the eight dollars he paid me for her . . . .So, eight dollars seems to be the price
of this cow, I reckon I owe you that for wintering her. Which makes her a sixteen dollar
cow .... "
"That cow wasn't worth eight dollars last fall," Houston said. "But she's worth a con-
siderable more now. She's eaten more than sixteen dollars' worth of my feed. Not to men-
tion my young bull topped her last week." "
When Houston and Mink fail to resolve the matter, Will Varner,
the justice of the peace, intervenes. Based on the price that two
professional cattle buyers are willing to pay for the cow, Varner
declares: "Call it [the cow's market value] thirty-seven and a half
then . . When you [Mink] pay Houston eighteen dollars and
seventy-five cents, you can have your cow." 39 Unable to pay the
judgement, Varner tells Mink that "he would have to work out
[the judgement] at fifty cents a day [by digging postholes and
36. Miss. CODE ANN. § 5444 (1930).
37. William Faulkner, The Mansion (New York: Random House. 1955), pp. 9-10.
38. Id., p. 14.
39. id., p. 17.
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stringing wire for Houston] to gain possession of his cow.""0 Mink
completes the work required of him. On the following day, Mink
returns to Houston's homestead to reclaim the cow. Houston
refuses to allow Mink to take possession of the cow until Mink
pays an extra dollar, the pound fee, for his failure to take posses-
sion on the preceding day.
Faulkner was apparently familiar with case law construing the
pound fee statute in writing this anecdote. His legal quotations
are accurate, and can be traced to an actual statute and various
cases. Under Mississippi law, a landowner had the right to charge
a pound fee for each day the livestock was in his care:
Any such live stock may be taken up and confined by any person upon whose land such
animal, or animals, may have entered or may be found, such person not having consented
for the animal, or animals, to run at large on such land, and when so taken up shall be
dealt with as estrays. For taking up any animal the person so taking the animal up shall
be allowed 50 cents per head for each animal taken up .... He may also receive reasonable
compensation for feeding and caring for such animals while keeping them.'
Houston's quotation of this law, in advising Mink of his legal
liability is accurate. "[T]he law says that when anybody has to
take up a stray animal and the owner dont claim it before dark
that same day, the man that took it up is entitled to a one-dollar
pound fee."4 2
At first glance it seems that Faulkner may have exercised a cer-
tain literary license in increasing the per day charge from fifty
cents to one dollar. A statewide daily charge of fifty cents per
head remained unchanged from 1881, the year of the statute's
enactment, until 1978, when the allowable charge was increased
to "ten dollars ($10.00) per head for each animal so taken up
.... "9" In 1929, however, a local option increasing the fee from
fifty cents to one dollar was passed in Oxford." Thus Faulkner's
quote of the local ordinance is precise. It is also quite possible
that Faulkner was familiar with the statute which provides that
"after the owner has been notified of the first trespass or injury,
double damages shall be recovered with costs." We know that
Mink was notified, and perhaps Faulkner, without going into the
details of the statute in his story, calculated a doubling of the fif-
ty cent charge provided by statute.
40. Id., p. 24.
41. Miss. CODE ANN. § 5444 (1930).
42. Faulkner, The Mansion, pp. 25-26.
43. Miss. CODE ANN. § 69-13-17 (Supp. 1984).
44. Robert Farley, interview in the Farley home in Oxford, Mississippi, August 1, 1977.
45. Miss. CODE ANN. § 5443 (1930).
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Mississippi law also required Houston to place the cow in an
enclosure, known as a pound and then to notify Mink of his posses-
sion. This requirement is set forth as follows:
When a person shall find any horse, mule, jack, cattle, sheep, goat or hog straying upon
his land, he may take up such animal, and, if the owner be known, he shall forthwith
send the estray to the owner or notify him of the taking of same."
Faulkner accurately follows this legal procedure in his story.
Houston notifies Mink of the "taking up" of the cow, by having
a townsman convey the information to Mink: "Jack Houston says
for you to come and get that bonerack of yours out of his feed
lot; he's tired of boarding it."" Oral rather than written notice
is given. Normally, only written notice would suffice: "a notice
that does not show the owner's name . . . is not sufficient. Nor
does actual knowledge on the part of the owner take the place
of the written notice .... " "
The defense of defective notice remains open and is not pur-
sued as an issue by Faulkner. The third-hand, casual oral notice
from an unidentified messenger could be challenged as defective
notice: "It was at Varner's store . . . .Until finally one said-
"149he didn't remember who; it didn't matter ....
Had he resorted to a court of law rather than taking the law
into his own hands by killing Houston, Mink might have argued
his right to return his cow without payment of the fee. He could
have argued that the notice he received was defective, and that
without written notice he was not liable for the costs of any care
provided to his cow during the winter. Faulkner might have per-
mitted an astute Flem Snopes to use this technicality to escape
liability. But Mink is not among the astute and clever group to
whom Faulkner might provide this legal insight. Nor does Mink
even suggest the pound fee is fifty cents per day and not a dollar.
Without legal knowledge Mink is obliged to negotiate an arrange-
ment for the recovery of his cow by digging post holes and string-
ing wire at fifty cents a day.
Faulkner may have read the statute in Stone's office. Moreover,
Faulkner may have been aware that a finder of livestock under
Mississippi law had an obligation to locate the owner and return
the livestock at the earliest possible date. But Faulkner chose to
place his characters on a path of legal confrontation. Had Mink
46. Miss. CODE ANN. § 5449 (1930).
47. Faulkner, The Mansion, p. 10.
48. 4 Am. JUR. 2D Animals § 43 (1962).
49. Faulkner, The Mansion, p. i0.
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consulted Flem, he might have suggested the defective notice as
the defense. Flem might have indicated that Houston's failure to
return the cow immediately upon learning the name of the owner
was also improper. It is quite probable that Faulkner considered
this option and chose to portray Mink as lacking in legal
knowledge, since any other portrayal would not be believable.
The "Pound Fee" incident has its roots in Mississippi law. In
Bloodworth v. Stevens,5" a lessee of fenced farmland and his lessor
disputed who bore responsibility for maintaining a fence to keep
cattle from entering lessee's planted fields. At the trial it was pro-
ved that "Bloodworth leased from Wiley H. Stevens ... for the
year 1872, 99 acres of land at $5 per acre, and that the intestate
[Stevens] agreed to keep in repair that portion of the fencing on
the eastern boundary ... and prevent any stock from getting into
the field and damaging the crop ... ." "'
The agreement to keep fences in repair, the development of a
dispute over a stray animal and damage to crops, and the death
of one party following the dispute and before trial, may have pro-
vided working material for Faulkner's imagination as he crafted
the pound fee dispute. Cases such as Bloodworth were available
in the lobby of the Stone law office, where Faulkner would often
sit and wait before seeing his lawyer and literary agent. Apparently
the time Faulkner spent waiting for Stone in his law office lobby
was not wasted.
There are other parts of the law which Faulkner may have con-
sidered and rejected as material in the "Pound Fee." Under
Mississippi law, "a man is entitled to permit his cattle and other
stock to go at large in the neighborhood range, and is not liable
as a trespasser for the damage done by them to the premises of
his neighbor, which are not enclosed by lawful fence." 52 This rule
of law as stated in The Vicksburg and Jackson R.R. Co. v. Pat-
ton, 3 was available to Faulkner at Stone's law office at the time
he wrote the "Pound Fee" incident. Had Faulkner adopted this
rule of law, the outcome of the incident would have been substan-
tially changed. Free grazing is suggested as the custom. Had
Faulkner chosen to employ this legal doctrine, the burden would
have been born by Houston who would be required to prove that
his land was carefully fenced. The facts indicate that there was
no fence enclosing at least some portion of Houston's land before
50. 51 Miss. 475 (1875).
51. Id. at 478.
52. The Vicksburg and Jackson R.R. Co. v. Patton, 31 Miss. 156, 186 (1856).
53. Id.
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Mink's post-digging work. Nor do the facts indicate that Houston
could have proved at trial the cost for feeding Mink's cow. Had
Flem rather than Mink owned the cow, the owner's statutory right
to replevy the animal could have been exercised: "The owner of
the animal ... may, after suit is brought and before final judg-
ment, replevy the animal by giving bond . . . and thereafter the
suit shall proceed and the bond be in place of the animal . . . ." "
Flem could peacefully and legally have recovered his cow and
then defeated Houston's claim for pound fee expenses by show-
ing defective notice of estray. From his reading Faulkner may
have discovered this temperate and calm procedure and even con-
sidered invoking the procedure. But responses of this kind would
have been inconsistent with Mink's nature and mental capacity.
If Houston had denied Flem's offer to remove the runaway cow
from his land, any monetary award to which Houston was en-
titled would not include the time after Flem's offer. In Galloway
v. Brown,55 the Mississippi Supreme Court states that:
[T]he plaintiff [livestock owner] . . . was entitled to shorten the period of the trespass
of his cattle by removing them from the lands of the defendants. If [plaintiff was] for-
bidden to come on the lands of the defendants to repossess the cattle ... then the defen-
dants would not be entitled to any damage caused after the plaintiff offered to remove
his cattle .. . ."
Had Faulkner permitted Mink to know this law, he could have
reduced his pound fee debt and avoided the final dispute with
Houston which led to the murder.
Finally, Faulkner might have permitted Flem to know that his
cattle could wander at liberty, under Mississippi law, on Houston's
unenclosed land as long as there was no actual damage done to
any fences. In Pongetti v. Spraggins,s7 the Mississippi Supreme
Court stated:
"It is now well established by authority and reason in this state, that uninclosed lands,
although private property, are a quasi common, or, as expressed in local parlance, a 'range,'
in which the owners of cattle ... may permit them to go out at large and depasture without
thereby incurring any responsibility as trespassers. [Ejach occupant of lands must secure
his fields by strong and sufficient enclosures against the intrusion of animals; and that
the owner cannot be held as a trespasser for their entering a close unless they have broken
a fence deemed in law sufficient to exclude them. Uninclosed lands in this state are held
subject to this right or easement."
54. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 5448 (1930).
55. 230 Miss. 471, 93 So. 2d 459 (1957).
56. Id. at 492, 93 So. 2d at 468.
57. 215 Miss. 397, 61 So. 2d 158 (1952).
58. Id. at 408. 61 So. 2d at 160 (quoting J. and G.N.R. Co. v. Field, 46 Miss. 573 (1872)).
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Had the cow strayed in summer and fattened on unplanted grass-
lands, Mink could have returned in the early autumn to collect
his cow without paying a fee. But Faulkner places the time of
the stray in winter. Costly feed thus replaces free grass and the
necessity for enclosed shelter and remuneration replaces free graz-
ing land. By carefully choosing the time of year, Faulkner selects
facts that logically result in the legal confrontation so crucial to
the story. As part of his meticulous concern for legal detail,
Faulkner displays his accurate knowledge of the Mississippi lo-
cal option law, by describing his fictitious county as one requir-
ing that "all stock would be kept up until all crops were out of
the field." 9 Faulkner acknowledges this detail: "[T]hen he [Mink]
had to keep the barren and worthless cow up under fence . . .
during the rest of that summer and fall, since the local [option]
agreement was that all stock would be kept up until all crops were
out of the field." 6
The "local agreement" referred to is the same option law
authorized in the General Stock Law of Mississippi,61 which
Faulkner could have reviewed in Stone's law office. Under this
law, each county had the option "upon the petition of twenty per
cent of the qualified electors [to hold an election] to vote upon
the question of whether or not the provisions of the State-wide
stock law shall remain in force in such county . . . ."" Accord-
ing to Faulkner's comment on the "local agreement," the fictitious
county in which the action takes place had apparently voted to
exclude itself from the general statewide law and therefore allow
animals to roam at large as set forth in Pongetti v. Spraggins.6 3
The local county, as was true of Lafayette County at that time,
had decided that "all stock would be kept up until all crops were
out of the field."6 Faulkner demonstrates both his knowledge of
the statewide stock law and the local option exercised by the elec-
tors of the county. In order to make his comment technically cor-
rect he is obliged to mention the local agreement. His legal
knowledge is thus consistent with actual law. He also notes the
close of the free grazing period: "[T]he moment, the day at last
at the end of winter when by local custom the livestock which
had run loose in the skeletoned cornfields since fall, must be taken
59. Faulkner, The Mansion, p. 9.
60. Id.
61. MIss. CODE ANN. § 4864 (1942 and Supp. 1954).
62. Id.
63. 215 Miss. 397, 61 So. 2d 158 (1952).
64. Faulkner, The Mansion, p. 9.
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up by their owners and put inside fences so the land could be
plowed and planted again ... ." 65
CONCLUSION
Whether Faulkner learned the fine legal points of these two anec-
dotes through conversations with lawyers or by his own legal
research is hard to determine; but it is clear that his meticulous
concern for detail and accuracy reflects a sound and consistent
working knowledge of both state and local law.
Faulkner uses the law to create a sense of character and
suspense. By his use of the law, Faulkner evokes humor and
tragedy, portrays strong emotions, and creates a sense of legal
realism. The uncourageous and callous attitude of the justice of
the peace, the outrage and indignation of Mrs. Tull, the stubborn
and mean attitude of Houston, and the lawless response of Mink
are exhibited in legal confrontations.
Faulkner does not suggest that the law itself is unjust. Injustice
results from the way the law is applied to human situations by
judges or lawyers. The law at times may seem unfair or unjust,
but Faulkner's legal confrontations are moments of truth and real-
ism. We can understand the outcomes given the human beings
involved, and their conditions. There are no happy endings or
romantic outcomes in Faulkner's legal entanglements. Such would
not be believable, given the oppressive human context in which
the legal confrontations arise. The law becomes a vehicle for un-
fairness. It permeates the human experience. The law is an in-
fluence but not an objective determinant when Faulkner's litigants
enter a courtroom. In the lives of the poor and uneducated the
law is applied without compassion or concern. At times its appli-
cation triggers feelings of helplessness and frustration leading to
the anger shown by Mink in murdering Houston and by Mrs. Tull
in her reaction to the judge's preposterous decision.
In both anecdotes the law is quoted with great accuracy. It is
used skillfully as part of the plot and character development. In
the Snopes trilogy, which at times relies heavily on stories about
horse-swapping, fence disputes, conning and trickery, the law is
an important resource for Faulkner as story material.
Faulkner's use of the law demonstrates his ability to consult sub-
ject matters foreign to his own professional training and to learn
them sufficiently to use them with ease and believability in his
novels. It is not possible to determine whether Faulkner developed
65. d., p. 13.
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his knowledge of the law by reading law books or hearing court-
room trials. Perhaps the reverse is true. Perhaps Faulkner picked
up these anecdotes through word of mouth; by sitting with men
on a country store front porch and swapping yarns; or walking
with Phil Stone and discussing Stone's cases.
Despite the source of Faulkner's legal knowledge, by studying
his use of the law we can learn more about Faulkner's creative
process, his values, and his procedure for constructing anecdotes
from real-life material. His accuracy reflects how carefully the
yarns were perhaps transmitted by word of mouth and then ac-
curately recorded by Faulkner, whose ear and memory for such
matters were incredible.
